VulnerabilityAwaiting Analysis

CVE-2026-72693

`openvt -u` is intended to identify the owner of the current VT and then execute `login` as that user from a privileged context.

HIGH 7.8EPSS 0.11%

Does this matter?

High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.11%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.

Description

`openvt -u` is intended to identify the owner of the current VT and then execute `login` as that user from a privileged context. In the documented `kbrequest`/init usage, the ownership test in `authenticate_user()` relies on `stat("/proc/<pid>/fd/0")`. `stat()` on `/proc/<pid>/fd/0` follows the symlink to the underlying TTY device node. As a result, `buf.st_uid` reflects the owner of the TTY node rather than the owner of the process holding the file descriptor. If the TTY owner returns to `root` or the getty owner after logout while an unprivileged process still has `fd 0` attached to that TTY, the check can incorrectly treat that process as belonging to the privileged console owner. Once that check succeeds, the `-u` path executes a passwordless login as the selected user. In the documented `kbrequest`/init deployment using `openvt -us`, this can result in passwordless `login -f root` on the spawned VT. This report establishes that privilege escalation path for that documented deployment; it does not claim equivalent reachability for deployments that do not use `openvt -u` from a privileged `kbrequest`/init path.

CVSS 3.1: 7.8 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS: 0.11% probability · 1th percentile
CISA KEV: Not listed
Weakness: CWE-284
Source: secalert@redhat.com

References

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.