CVE-2026-6720
When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.22%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line. The struct embeds every credential calicoctl uses to talk to the cluster — inline kubeconfig (with bearer token), Kubernetes API bearer token, etcd password, and inline PEM-encoded etcd client certificate and key. Any reader of that stderr stream — CI job logs, session-recording archives, shared support-ticket transcripts, or local filesystem viewers on the host that ran calicoctl — can extract these credentials with zero Kubernetes privilege. calicoctl's default log level is panic, so this issue only triggers when verbose logging is explicitly enabled.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.2 HIGHCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.22% probability · 13th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-532
- Source
- psirt@tigera.io
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.