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UK Cyber Defence
VulnerabilityReceived

CVE-2026-81011

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count. hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates…

HIGH 7.1EPSS 0.13%

Does this matter?

High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.13%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count. hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj->package.count and then calls one of the five hp_populate_*_package_data() wrappers (string, integer, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a count to its hp_populate_*_elements_from_package() parser, but instead of forwarding the validated obj->package.count it derives the count from elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an ACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading ->package.count from it in fact reads ->string.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound themselves against the length of the name string rather than against the real number of elements in the package. This is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any package that has fewer than the type's element count, so a parser only ever runs on a full package and never reads past it regardless of the bogus bound. An upcoming change relaxes that check to accept shorter packages. Once a parser can receive fewer elements than its per-type count, a bound taken from the name length no longer reflects the array size, and the "elem < count" loop conditions and "elem + n >= count" sub-loop guards read past the end of elements[] - an out-of-bounds heap read. Forward the validated obj->package.count to every *_package_data() wrapper so the parsers bound themselves against the real package size. This does not change behaviour for the packages that enumerate correctly today and is a prerequisite for accepting shorter packages safely.

CVSS 3.1
7.1 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
EPSS
0.13% probability · 2th percentile
Public exploits
None in Exploit-DB
CISA KEV
Not listed
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
EPSS trend
0%3%5%26 October 2026: 0.13%26 October 202626 October 2026

EPSS 0.1% since 26 October 2026; no change recorded yet. Points are recorded when the score first appears and whenever it moves by a percentage point or more.

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA, exploits from Exploit-DB. Refreshed daily. Download this record as JSON.