CVE-2026-73656
A caller with a valid API key for one project can submit another project's deployment identifier, link an attacker-owned background worker to the victim deployment, and move the victim deployment from BUILDING to DEPLOYING.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.34%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. Prior to 4.5.6, POST /api/v1/deployments/:deploymentId/background-workers calls CreateDeploymentBackgroundWorkerServiceV4.call() in apps/webapp/app/v3/services/createDeploymentBackgroundWorkerV4.server.ts, where workerDeployment.findFirst() selects a deployment by friendlyId without an environmentId predicate. A caller with a valid API key for one project can submit another project's deployment identifier, link an attacker-owned background worker to the victim deployment, and move the victim deployment from BUILDING to DEPLOYING. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.6.
- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.34% probability · 27th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-639, CWE-862
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.