CVE-2026-73567
An attacker who can observe the process's Math.random() outputs and estimate the key-generation time can reconstruct the seed, recover generated SM2 private keys, and predict signing ephemeral scalars used to forge signatures.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.32%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
sm-crypto provides JavaScript implementations of the Chinese cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3, and SM4. Prior to 0.5.0, the default no-argument sm2.generateKeyPairHex() path in Node.js uses the module-wide SecureRandom instance in src/sm2/utils.js, supplied by jsbn@1.1.0, which seeds an ARC4 stream from Math.random() and new Date().getTime() because window.crypto.getRandomValues is unavailable even though globalThis.crypto exists. An attacker who can observe the process's Math.random() outputs and estimate the key-generation time can reconstruct the seed, recover generated SM2 private keys, and predict signing ephemeral scalars used to forge signatures. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0.
- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.32% probability · 25th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-338
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.