CVE-2026-71849
A client may therefore receive response headers that the origin intended only for its immediate peer, disclosing connection scoped or internal metadata contained in such headers, when an application proxies responses from an origin that declares…
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.24%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.7.0 to 4.12.33, the Proxy Helper proxy() function in hono/proxy does not remove response headers named by the origin's Connection header. Per RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1, an intermediary must remove the header fields listed in a message's Connection header field before forwarding the message, in addition to the well known hop by hop headers, but the proxy() function only removed the well known hop by hop headers, including Connection itself, from origin responses. A client may therefore receive response headers that the origin intended only for its immediate peer, disclosing connection scoped or internal metadata contained in such headers, when an application proxies responses from an origin that declares additional, non standard headers as hop by hop via the Connection response header. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
- CVSS 3.1
- 3.7 LOWCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.24% probability · 15th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-200
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.