CVE-2026-64114
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5 raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length: iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL;…
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.14%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5 raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length: iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free; if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ } It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic. An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path. Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to. Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it. Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain the self-reported iph->ihl. Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the trigger uses a real netdev. Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock distro kernel.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.14% probability · 3th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-125
- Affected
- linux/linux kernel
- Source
- 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1065b9efa4126df559b03a849c139ecfae92cd25Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/145e9afa5b905229b4788bb72c3255f5a5f77508Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c5411fa4944ed99af3d9d1de750ea8169b6dac9Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a564f737ec54d63e8ee221d3ff396d07586d464Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7725cd3b471740fd23d25ed1da722c671fb2a5d3Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/915fab69823a14c170dbaa3b41978768e0fe62fcPatch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbe0be67de296176e7243c76e3d9f02f6ae9ff0bPatch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc20dbd48c26e743f7e0845020c11ed2ce8b15eePatch
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.