CVE-2026-6329
PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.21%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.0 MEDIUMCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.21% probability · 12th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-347
- Affected
- wolfssl/wolfssl
- Source
- facts@wolfssl.com
References
- https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10192Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.