CVE-2026-62675
Prior to 0.3.0, multipart POST /v1/sessions accepts an authenticated user's agent bundle and omnigent/server/bundles.py validate_agent_bundle does not reject a tools..callable dotted Python path. omnigent/runner/tool_dispatch.py _resolve_spec_callable…
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.45%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, multipart POST /v1/sessions accepts an authenticated user's agent bundle and omnigent/server/bundles.py validate_agent_bundle does not reject a tools..callable dotted Python path. omnigent/runner/tool_dispatch.py _resolve_spec_callable imports the specified module and _execute_spec_callable_tool invokes the resolved function, allowing a bundle to select subprocess.check_output and execute a local command with the runner process permissions. This can expose runner files, environment variables, credentials, workspace data, internal services, and availability without administrator access. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.
- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.45% probability · 38th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-94
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/1f3f398f41cbf97b905133c21e848621c21da6e0
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/1430
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/tag/v0.3.0
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-756x-9hf6-q4h4
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-756x-9hf6-q4h4
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.