CVE-2026-61536
There is no allowlist or sanitization on import_path, so any importable Python attribute (e.g. os.system, subprocess.getoutput) can be selected.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.30%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. In versions prior to 2.4.3, banks parses Tool JSON objects from the rendered body of {% completion %} blocks and later resolves their import_path field through importlib.import_module(...) + getattr(...) to obtain the callable that handles a tool call. There is no allowlist or sanitization on import_path, so any importable Python attribute (e.g. os.system, subprocess.getoutput) can be selected. When the LLM emits a tool_calls entry whose function.name matches the attacker-supplied tool name, the resolved callable is invoked with kwargs decoded from tool_call.function.arguments, yielding arbitrary code execution in the banks-hosting process. This is distinct from GHSA-gphh-9q3h-jgpp / CVE-2026-44209. That advisory was fixed in 2.4.2 by switching src/banks/env.py from Environment to SandboxedEnvironment. The fix does not touch src/banks/extensions/completion.py, and the unsafe import + getattr chain still executes on 2.4.2. The malicious Tool JSON is plain text in the rendered template body — it requires no Jinja attribute access, so the sandbox is irrelevant. This issue has been fixed in version 2.4.3.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.30% probability · 23th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-94, CWE-470
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.