CVE-2026-59858
Prior to 9.2.0735, the C omni-completion script in runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim interpolates the typeref: or typename: extension field of a tags entry, without escaping, into a :vimgrep pattern that is run through :execute.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.14%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0735, the C omni-completion script in runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim interpolates the typeref: or typename: extension field of a tags entry, without escaping, into a :vimgrep pattern that is run through :execute. Because :vimgrep honors the bar as a command separator, a crafted tag field can close the search pattern and append an arbitrary Ex command; opening a hostile .c file whose project tags file contains such an entry and invoking C omni-completion runs that command as the editing user. This issue is fixed in version 9.2.0735.
- CVSS 4.0
- 8.4 HIGHCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.14% probability · 3th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-94
- Affected
- vim/vim
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.