SOC status:Duty analyst on shift

UK Cyber Defence
VulnerabilityAnalyzed

CVE-2026-58481

The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list.

MEDIUM 6.5EPSS 0.20%

Does this matter?

Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.20%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.

Description

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope.

CVSS 3.1
6.5 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
0.20% probability · 10th percentile
CISA KEV
Not listed
Weakness
CWE-22, CWE-23
Affected
network-ai/network-ai
Source
security-advisories@github.com

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.