CVE-2026-57144
Its SandboxConfig.native() path lets callers configure allowed filesystem paths and network=False.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.12%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.110 to before version 4.6.61, praisonai.sandbox.SandlockSandbox is documented and implemented as the kernel-enforced sandbox backend for untrusted code. Its SandboxConfig.native() path lets callers configure allowed filesystem paths and network=False. On systems where the optional sandlock module imports but reports that Landlock is unavailable, SandlockSandbox.execute() and run_command() do not fail closed. They silently fall back to SubprocessSandbox(self.config). That fallback keeps the same high-level native policy object but does not enforce the native filesystem or network boundary during code execution. A sandboxed payload can read files outside the configured allowed path and open network connections despite network=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.
- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.12% probability · 2th percentile
- Public exploits
- None in Exploit-DB
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-266, CWE-668, CWE-693
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
EPSS moved from 0.2% on 24 October 2026 to 0.1% on 26 October 2026.
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA, exploits from Exploit-DB. Refreshed daily. Download this record as JSON.