CVE-2026-57114
An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.19%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.2 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.19% probability · 8th percentile
- Public exploits
- None in Exploit-DB
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-367, CWE-918
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
EPSS moved from 0.2% on 24 October 2026 to 0.2% on 26 October 2026.
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA, exploits from Exploit-DB. Refreshed daily. Download this record as JSON.