CVE-2026-56672
Prior to 0.28.0, GET /userdata/{file} served user-controlled HTML and SVG files with extension-derived content types, allowing stored cross-site scripting in the ComfyUI origin and access to browser-stored API tokens, settings, workflows, and…
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.24%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
ComfyUI is a node-based diffusion model GUI, API, and backend. Prior to 0.28.0, GET /userdata/{file} served user-controlled HTML and SVG files with extension-derived content types, allowing stored cross-site scripting in the ComfyUI origin and access to browser-stored API tokens, settings, workflows, and authenticated-equivalent API calls. The handler used web.FileResponse(path), so an uploaded .html/.svg was served as text/html/image/svg+xml. POST /userdata stores arbitrary request bodies (confined to the user's userdata directory). When a victim navigated to the file URL, the embedded script executed same-origin. The /view endpoint already forced dangerous MIME types to download; that protection had never been applied to /userdata. This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.
- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.24% probability · 15th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-79
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.