CVE-2026-55524
In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.19%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.19% probability · 9th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-367, CWE-918
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.