CVE-2026-55441
A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.18%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.
- CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.18% probability · 8th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-78, CWE-94, CWE-732
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.