CVE-2026-5503
This caused TLSX_UseSNI to attach the attacker-controlled publicName to the shared WOLFSSL_CTX when no inner SNI was configured.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.39%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
In TLSX_EchChangeSNI, the ctx->extensions branch set extensions unconditionally even when TLSX_Find returned NULL. This caused TLSX_UseSNI to attach the attacker-controlled publicName to the shared WOLFSSL_CTX when no inner SNI was configured. TLSX_EchRestoreSNI then failed to clean it up because its removal was gated on serverNameX != NULL. The inner ClientHello was sized before the pollution but written after it, causing TLSX_SNI_Write to memcpy 255 bytes past the allocation boundary.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.9 MEDIUMCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.39% probability · 33th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-787
- Affected
- wolfssl/wolfssl
- Source
- facts@wolfssl.com
References
- https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10102Issue Tracking
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.