CVE-2026-54342
In epa4all, prior to version 2026-05-20, an attacker on the network path between epa4all and any backend (ePA Aktensystem, Konnektor, IDP, TSS) can present a self-signed TLS certificate and intercept the connection.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.20%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
In epa4all, prior to version 2026-05-20, an attacker on the network path between epa4all and any backend (ePA Aktensystem, Konnektor, IDP, TSS) can present a self-signed TLS certificate and intercept the connection. For non-VAU connections (Konnektor, IDP), this allows direct read and modification of the inner traffic, including smartcard operations and OIDC authentication exchanges. For the ePA backend, the disabled TLS verification is the transport-level enabler for the VAU MITM described in GHSA-vvh7-x6c7-46gh. This issue has been patched in version 2026-05-20.
- CVSS 3.1
- 8.1 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.20% probability · 9th percentile
- Public exploits
- None in Exploit-DB
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-295
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
EPSS 0.2% since 27 October 2026; no change recorded yet. Points are recorded when the score first appears and whenever it moves by a percentage point or more.
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA, exploits from Exploit-DB. Refreshed daily. Download this record as JSON.