CVE-2026-54052
Prior to 2.56.1, in HTTP mode with multi-tenancy enabled through ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true, n8n-mcp's local workflow version history backups were not isolated per tenant, allowing an authenticated tenant to read workflow version snapshots belonging to…
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.39%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.56.1, in HTTP mode with multi-tenancy enabled through ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true, n8n-mcp's local workflow version history backups were not isolated per tenant, allowing an authenticated tenant to read workflow version snapshots belonging to other tenants and delete or destroy other tenants' stored backups, including full node definitions, credential references, and authorization headers. This issue is fixed in version 2.56.1.
- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
- EPSS
- 0.39% probability · 32th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-639, CWE-862
- Affected
- n8n-mcp/n8n-mcp
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/releases/tag/v2.56.1Release Notes
- https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-j6r7-6fhx-77wxMitigation, Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.