CVE-2026-53536
Prior to 0.83.0, the /v1/step-files/signed download endpoint verified the supplied JWT against the shared signing secret but did not check the token's audience, and combined with a missing null-check on the decoded fileId, this allowed any caller…
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.24%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
Activepieces is an open source AI workflow automation platform. Prior to 0.83.0, the /v1/step-files/signed download endpoint verified the supplied JWT against the shared signing secret but did not check the token's audience, and combined with a missing null-check on the decoded fileId, this allowed any caller holding any valid Activepieces JWT (including a freshly created user's own access token) to receive a step-file belonging to another tenant. The file returned was whatever PostgreSQL happened to scan first for type = FLOW_STEP_FILE, varying over time as the database changed, so an authenticated user could obtain step-file attachments belonging to other tenants on the same instance; the attacker could not target a specific victim or file, and the access was read-only with no integrity or availability impact. This issue is fixed in version 0.83.0.
- CVSS 4.0
- 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.24% probability · 15th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-345, CWE-639
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/activepieces/activepieces/commit/2cb6148010a6c2a22900f4c8b08d75cc5c921d1c
- https://github.com/activepieces/activepieces/commit/afe852f60e39fcc6273d41e11f0765586b5a0e49
- https://github.com/activepieces/activepieces/releases/tag/0.83.0
- https://github.com/activepieces/activepieces/security/advisories/GHSA-9723-fmff-mc24
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.