CVE-2026-50181
As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.18%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, Langroid's `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`. As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory. This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory. Version 0.64.0 patches the issue.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.18% probability · 8th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-22, CWE-23
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.