CVE-2026-50015
An attacker who contributes a malicious patch file via a pull request can write attacker-controlled content to or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem during pnpm install, as the user running the install.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.43%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.0 and 11.4.0, pnpm's patch application pipeline (@pnpm/patch-package) performs no path validation on file paths extracted from .patch files. An attacker who contributes a malicious patch file via a pull request can write attacker-controlled content to or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem during pnpm install, as the user running the install. The diff --git header paths containing ../../ sequences traverse out of the package directory, and the traversal is difficult to catch in code review because patch file diff headers are opaque to most reviewers. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.34.0 and 11.4.0.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.3 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.43% probability · 36th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-22
- Affected
- pnpm/pnpm
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-rxhj-4m44-96r4Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-rxhj-4m44-96r4Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.