CVE-2026-48170
Any service that calls `scimPatch()` on attacker-controlled JSON (i.e. any SCIM endpoint accepting `PATCH` from an external IdP) is exploitable on a stock Node runtime.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.25%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
`scim-patch`, a library to perform SCIM patch, prior to version 0.9.1 performs prototype pollution when applying a SCIM PATCH operation whose `value` object contains a key like `"__proto__.someProp"`. After one such patch, `Object.prototype.someProp` is set process-wide, affecting every plain object in the Node process. Any service that calls `scimPatch()` on attacker-controlled JSON (i.e. any SCIM endpoint accepting `PATCH` from an external IdP) is exploitable on a stock Node runtime. Version 0.9.1 contains a patch. A workaround is available. Calling `Object.freeze(Object.prototype)` (and the same on `Array.prototype`, `Function.prototype`) at process startup neutralizes this class of bug — assignment to a frozen prototype becomes a silent no-op in sloppy mode or a `TypeError` in strict mode. Node's `--frozen-intrinsics` flag does this for built-ins automatically.
- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
- EPSS
- 0.25% probability · 16th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-1321
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.