CVE-2026-47751
Prior to 1.0.74, because the action checked out attacker-controlled pull request head branches, read .mcp.json from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabled all project MCP servers via enableAllProjectMcpServers, an…
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.77%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
Claude Code Action is a general-purpose GitHub action that runs Claude Code on GitHub pull requests and issues. Prior to 1.0.74, because the action checked out attacker-controlled pull request head branches, read .mcp.json from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabled all project MCP servers via enableAllProjectMcpServers, an attacker who opened a pull request containing a malicious .mcp.json file could achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner and exfiltrate secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user or an automatic trigger invoked the Claude action on the pull request. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.74, which restores .claude/ and .mcp.json from the pull request base branch before the CLI runs.
- CVSS 4.0
- 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.77% probability · 53th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-78, CWE-200
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/commit/9ddce40de8c1ab71fb6303a125fdad0968dc1312
- https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/pull/1066
- https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/releases/tag/v1.0.74
- https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/security/advisories/GHSA-8q5r-mmjf-575q
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.