VulnerabilityModified

CVE-2026-47691

An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`).

CRITICAL 10.0EPSS 0.32%

Does this matter?

High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.32%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.

Description

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

CVSS 3.1: 10.0 CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS: 0.32% probability · 25th percentile
CISA KEV: Not listed
Weakness: CWE-345, CWE-346
Affected: netty/netty
Source: security-advisories@github.com

References

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.