CVE-2026-47065
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.50%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.
- CVSS 3.1
- 9.8 CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.50% probability · 41th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-502
- Affected
- apache/mina
- Source
- security@apache.org
References
- https://lists.apache.org/thread/y7xj1bl8qo47p9bktb11hg5v6k1d4dyjMailing List, Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.