CVE-2026-46491
Prior to version 7.0.3, simplesamlphp-module-casserver builds file paths for the file-based CAS ticket store by directly concatenating the configured ticket directory with an attacker-controlled ticket identifier.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.42%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
SimpleSAMLphp-casserver is a CAS 1.0 and 2.0 compliant CAS server in the form of a SimpleSAMLphp module. Prior to version 7.0.3, simplesamlphp-module-casserver builds file paths for the file-based CAS ticket store by directly concatenating the configured ticket directory with an attacker-controlled ticket identifier. Public CAS validation/proxy endpoints pass attacker-controlled ticket / pgt query parameters into this store. In deployments using FileSystemTicketStore, a remote attacker can use path traversal sequences such as ../target.serialized to make the CAS server read and unserialize files outside the ticket directory. In the CAS 1.0 validation flow, the same attacker-selected path is also passed to deleteTicket() immediately after getTicket() returns, which can delete the target file when it is readable by the PHP process, deletable under the PHP process filesystem permissions, and unserializes to a value compatible with the ?array return type. This issue has been patched in version 7.0.3.
- CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
- EPSS
- 0.42% probability · 36th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-22
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.