VulnerabilityDeferred

CVE-2026-45549

Roxy-WI executes the systemd action over its own SSH credentials (passwordless sudo), so the action runs as root on the target.

HIGH 8.5EPSS 0.20%

Does this matter?

High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.20%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.

Description

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, agent_action (app/routes/smon/agent_routes.py:166-179) has decorators @bp.post('/agent/action/<action>') and @jwt_required() only — no role check, no group ownership check on the server_ip form field. Any authenticated user, including role 4 (guest), can start, stop, or restart the roxy-wi-smon-agent systemd unit on any server they can name. Roxy-WI executes the systemd action over its own SSH credentials (passwordless sudo), so the action runs as root on the target. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

CVSS 3.1: 8.5 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H
EPSS: 0.20% probability · 10th percentile
CISA KEV: Not listed
Weakness: CWE-862, CWE-863
Source: security-advisories@github.com

References

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.