VulnerabilityAwaiting Analysis

CVE-2026-45103

In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the TCP message framing layer parses the Content-Length header using unsigned int arithmetic with no overflow check.

HIGH 7.5EPSS 0.33%

Does this matter?

High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.33%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.

Description

OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the TCP message framing layer parses the Content-Length header using unsigned int arithmetic with no overflow check. When an attacker sends a Content-Length value that overflows unsigned int (e.g., 4294967296), the framing layer computes a wrapped-around value (e.g., 0) and splits the TCP stream at the wrong boundary, causing the body of the first SIP message to be processed as a separate message and enabling SIP message smuggling. Because Content-Length is parsed in the transport layer before authentication, an unauthenticated, network-based attacker can smuggle arbitrary SIP messages over any TCP-based transport (proto_tcp, proto_tls, proto_ws, proto_wss) on any instance with TCP enabled, with no routing-script preconditions. This allows smuggled messages to bypass front-end SBC/proxy security policies, inherit the connection's authentication context, and evade rate limiting. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1.

CVSS 3.1: 7.5 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
EPSS: 0.33% probability · 26th percentile
CISA KEV: Not listed
Weakness: CWE-190
Source: security-advisories@github.com

References

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.