VulnerabilityModified

CVE-2026-44893

If the attacker sets the TLV length below 5, the subsequent readByte/readInt throws IndexOutOfBoundsException.

HIGH 7.5EPSS 0.62%

Does this matter?

High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.62%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.

Description

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-haproxy prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, when decoding a PP2_TYPE_SSL TLV, HAProxyMessage.readNextTLV() first calls `header.retainedSlice(header.readerIndex(), length)` and only then reads the 1-byte client field and 4-byte verify field. If the attacker sets the TLV length below 5, the subsequent readByte/readInt throws IndexOutOfBoundsException. HAProxyMessageDecoder only catches HAProxyProtocolException around this call, so the IOOBE propagates and the retained slice on the pooled cumulation buffer is never released. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

CVSS 3.1: 7.5 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS: 0.62% probability · 48th percentile
CISA KEV: Not listed
Weakness: CWE-703, CWE-805
Affected: netty/netty
Source: security-advisories@github.com

References

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.