CVE-2026-41670
An attacker who knows the Entity ID of a registered SP client can craft a SAML AuthnRequest with an arbitrary AssertionConsumerServiceURL, causing the IdP to send the signed SAML response -- containing user identity attributes (login name, email, roles,…
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.28%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the SAML IdP implementation in Admidio's SSO module uses the AssertionConsumerServiceURL value directly from incoming SAML AuthnRequest messages as the destination for the SAML response, without validating it against the registered ACS URL (smc_acs_url) stored in the database for the corresponding service provider client. An attacker who knows the Entity ID of a registered SP client can craft a SAML AuthnRequest with an arbitrary AssertionConsumerServiceURL, causing the IdP to send the signed SAML response -- containing user identity attributes (login name, email, roles, profile fields) -- to an attacker-controlled URL. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.28% probability · 20th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-20, CWE-601
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.