CVE-2026-41481
Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.26%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.
- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.26% probability · 18th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-918
- Affected
- langchain/langchain-text-splitters
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.