CVE-2026-40159
Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP("npx -y @smithery/cli ...")).
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.18%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP("npx -y @smithery/cli ...")). These commands are executed through Python’s subprocess module. By default, the implementation forwards the entire parent process environment to the spawned subprocess. As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials. This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as npx -y, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.
- CVSS 3.1
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.18% probability · 8th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-214
- Affected
- praison/praisonai
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.