CVE-2026-34462
Because the service pipe accepts variable-length packets larger than the request structure, an attacker can fill the boxname field with non-zero data and append additional controlled wide characters after the structure. wcscpy then reads past the fixed…
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.17%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, several ProcessServer handlers (KillAllHandler, SuspendAllHandler, and RunSandboxedHandler) copy a WCHAR boxname[34] field from request structures into WCHAR[40] stack buffers using wcscpy without verifying null termination. Because the service pipe accepts variable-length packets larger than the request structure, an attacker can fill the boxname field with non-zero data and append additional controlled wide characters after the structure. wcscpy then reads past the fixed field and overflows the destination stack buffer. The service pipe is created with a NULL DACL, allowing any local process to connect, and the unsafe copy occurs before authorization checks. This can lead to a crash of the SbieSvc service or potential code execution as SYSTEM. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.3 HIGHCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.17% probability · 7th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-121, CWE-170
- Affected
- sandboxie-plus/sandboxie
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/sandboxie-plus/Sandboxie/security/advisories/GHSA-9cjg-vh9m-hhx4Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.