CVE-2026-34067
The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.32%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.
- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.32% probability · 25th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-617
- Affected
- nimiq/nimiq proof-of-stake
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/6ff0800e8e031363e787c827d8d033e5694e4e6aPatch
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3659Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0Release Notes
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-264v-m8fm-76jmPatch, Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.