CVE-2026-34046
This allowed any authenticated user to read any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys; modify the logic of another user's AI agents, and/or delete flows belonging to other users.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.47%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.5.1, the `_read_flow` helper in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py` branched on the `AUTO_LOGIN` setting to decide whether to filter by `user_id`. When `AUTO_LOGIN` was `False` (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check — the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it. This allowed any authenticated user to read any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys; modify the logic of another user's AI agents, and/or delete flows belonging to other users. The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to accommodate public/example flows (those with `user_id = NULL`) under auto-login mode, but inadvertently left the authenticated path without an ownership filter. The fix in version 1.5.1 removes the `AUTO_LOGIN` conditional entirely and unconditionally scopes the query to the requesting user.
- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 HIGHCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.47% probability · 39th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-639, CWE-862
- Affected
- langflow/langflow · langflow/langflow-base
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/8956Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-8c4j-f57c-35cfPatch, Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.