CVE-2026-32747
In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.41%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the globalCopyFiles API eads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.
- CVSS 3.1
- 4.9 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.41% probability · 35th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-22, CWE-184
- Affected
- b3log/siyuan
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/9914fd1d39e5f0a8dcc9fb587e1c0b46f31490a1Patch
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1Release Notes
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6Exploit, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6Exploit, Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.