CVE-2026-28742
Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.33%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image. Once this salt is recovered from any device, an attacker can generate valid signatures for arbitrary device or account operations due to the absence of per-device keys, server-side nonce tracking, or replay protections. Combined with the system’s use of plain HTTP for control-plane traffic, the construction enables broad request forgery and impersonation across the platform.
- CVSS 4.0
- 9.2 CRITICALCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.33% probability · 26th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-321
- Source
- ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.