CVE-2026-26994
This allowed an active network adversary to downgrade TLS 1.3 connections initiated by a uTLS client to a lower TLS version (e.g., TLS 1.2) by modifying the ClientHello message to exclude the SupportedVersions extension, causing the server to respond…
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.27%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
uTLS is a fork of crypto/tls, created to customize ClientHello for fingerprinting resistance while still using it for the handshake. In versions 1.6.7 and below, uTLS did not implement the TLS 1.3 downgrade protection mechanism specified in RFC 8446 Section 4.1.3 when using a uTLS ClientHello spec. This allowed an active network adversary to downgrade TLS 1.3 connections initiated by a uTLS client to a lower TLS version (e.g., TLS 1.2) by modifying the ClientHello message to exclude the SupportedVersions extension, causing the server to respond with a TLS 1.2 ServerHello (along with a downgrade canary in the ServerHello random field). Because uTLS did not check the downgrade canary in the ServerHello random field, clients would accept the downgraded connection without detecting the attack. This attack could also be used by an active network attacker to fingerprint uTLS connections. This issue has been fixed in version 1.7.0.
- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.27% probability · 19th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-693
- Affected
- refraction-networking/utls
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls/commit/f8892761e2a4d29054264651d3a86fda83bc83f9Patch
- https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls/issues/181Issue Tracking
- https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls/pull/337Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls/security/advisories/GHSA-pmc3-p9hx-jq96Patch, Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.