CVE-2026-26327

{
    "cve": {
        "id": "CVE-2026-26327",
        "cveTags": [],
        "metrics": {
            "cvssMetricV31": [
                {
                    "type": "Primary",
                    "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
                    "cvssData": {
                        "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                        "version": "3.1",
                        "baseScore": 6.5,
                        "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
                        "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
                        "integrityImpact": "NONE",
                        "userInteraction": "NONE",
                        "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                        "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
                        "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                        "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
                    },
                    "impactScore": 3.6,
                    "exploitabilityScore": 2.8
                }
            ],
            "cvssMetricV40": [
                {
                    "type": "Secondary",
                    "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
                    "cvssData": {
                        "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "version": "4.0",
                        "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "baseScore": 7.1,
                        "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "attackVector": "ADJACENT",
                        "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                        "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                        "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "userInteraction": "NONE",
                        "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                        "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                        "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                        "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                        "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                        "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                        "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                        "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                        "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"
                    }
                }
            ]
        },
        "published": "2026-02-19T23:16:26.100",
        "references": [
            {
                "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586",
                "tags": [
                    "Patch"
                ],
                "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
            },
            {
                "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14",
                "tags": [
                    "Product",
                    "Release Notes"
                ],
                "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
            },
            {
                "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99",
                "tags": [
                    "Patch",
                    "Vendor Advisory"
                ],
                "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
            }
        ],
        "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
        "weaknesses": [
            {
                "type": "Primary",
                "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
                "description": [
                    {
                        "lang": "en",
                        "value": "CWE-345"
                    }
                ]
            }
        ],
        "descriptions": [
            {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection. As of time of publication, the iOS and Android apps are alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue. Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints. Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins. In iOS/Android, first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU) and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only. In Android, hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning)."
            },
            {
                "lang": "es",
                "value": "OpenClaw es un asistente personal de IA. Las balizas de descubrimiento (Bonjour/mDNS y DNS-SD) incluyen registros TXT como 'lanHost', 'tailnetDns', 'gatewayPort' y 'gatewayTlsSha256'. Los registros TXT no est\u00e1n autenticados. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 2026.2.14, algunos clientes trataban los valores TXT como entradas autoritativas de enrutamiento/fijaci\u00f3n. iOS y macOS usaban las sugerencias de host ('lanHost'/'tailnetDns') y los puertos ('gatewayPort') proporcionados por TXT para construir la URL de conexi\u00f3n. iOS y Android permit\u00edan que la huella digital TLS ('gatewayTlsSha256') proporcionada por el descubrimiento anulara una fijaci\u00f3n TLS previamente almacenada. En una LAN compartida/no confiable, un atacante podr\u00eda anunciar un servicio '_openclaw-gw._tcp' malicioso. Esto podr\u00eda hacer que un cliente se conectara a un punto final controlado por un atacante y/o aceptara un certificado de atacante, potencialmente exfiltrando credenciales de Gateway ('auth.token' / 'auth.password') durante la conexi\u00f3n. En el momento de la publicaci\u00f3n, las aplicaciones de iOS y Android est\u00e1n en fase alfa/no se han distribuido ampliamente (sin lanzamiento p\u00fablico en App Store / Play Store). El impacto pr\u00e1ctico se limita principalmente a desarrolladores/probadores que ejecutan esas compilaciones, adem\u00e1s de cualquier otro cliente distribuido que dependa del descubrimiento en una LAN compartida/no confiable. La versi\u00f3n 2026.2.14 corrige el problema. Los clientes ahora prefieren el punto final de servicio resuelto (SRV + A/AAAA) sobre las sugerencias de enrutamiento proporcionadas por TXT. Las huellas digitales proporcionadas por el descubrimiento ya no anulan las fijaciones TLS almacenadas. En iOS/Android, las fijaciones TLS por primera vez requieren confirmaci\u00f3n expl\u00edcita del usuario (huella digital mostrada; sin TOFU silencioso) y las conexiones directas basadas en descubrimiento son solo TLS. En Android, la verificaci\u00f3n de nombre de host ya no est\u00e1 deshabilitada globalmente (solo se omite al fijar)."
            }
        ],
        "lastModified": "2026-02-23T13:44:36.753",
        "configurations": [
            {
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}