CVE-2026-26317
Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.14%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.14, browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins. A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim's local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim's browser context. Starting in version 2026.2.14, mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`). Other mitigations include enabling browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
- EPSS
- 0.14% probability · 4th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-352
- Affected
- openclaw/openclaw
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.