CVE-2026-17534
Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.12%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.
- CVSS 3.1
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.12% probability · 2th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-918
- Source
- reefs@jfrog.com
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.