CVE-2026-15144
Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.25%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
@fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option.
- CVSS 3.1
- 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.25% probability · 16th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-307, CWE-770
- Affected
- fastify/fastify\/rate-limit
- Source
- ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.