SOC status:Duty analyst on shift

UK Cyber Defence
VulnerabilityAwaiting Analysis

CVE-2026-12629

When an application enables error-interrupt reporting via the public uart_irq_err_enable() API, an attacker who controls the serial peer can deterministically assert these error bits by injecting line errors on the RX line — a baud/stop-bit mismatch or…

MEDIUM 4.6EPSS 0.17%

Does this matter?

Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.17%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.

Description

The ARM PL011 UART driver in drivers/serial/uart_pl011.c fails to acknowledge receive error interrupts. On the PL011, the framing, parity, break, and overrun error interrupts (PL011_IMSC_ERROR_MASK) are cleared only by writing the interrupt-clear register UARTICR; reading the data register clears the RX interrupt and the per-byte RSR status but not the error interrupt status in MIS. The interrupt service routine pl011_isr() acknowledged only the CTS modem-status interrupt and never wrote icr for the error bits, so an asserted error interrupt remains pending after the ISR returns. When an application enables error-interrupt reporting via the public uart_irq_err_enable() API, an attacker who controls the serial peer can deterministically assert these error bits by injecting line errors on the RX line — a baud/stop-bit mismatch or mid-character break (framing/break error), a flipped parity bit (parity error), or FIFO flooding (overrun error). Because the error interrupt is never cleared, the interrupt line stays asserted and the CPU re-enters pl011_isr() immediately and indefinitely, producing an interrupt-storm livelock from which the core makes no forward progress. The impact is an availability-only denial of service (permanent hang), reachable from an external or removable UART peer. Exploitation is gated by configuration: the error interrupt is off by default and no in-tree subsystem enables it, so only applications that explicitly call uart_irq_err_enable() on a PL011-based, interrupt-driven port are affected. The fix makes pl011_isr() acknowledge the pending error bits via uart->icr, breaking the loop, and additionally clears the latched RSR status in pl011_err_check().

CVSS 3.1
4.6 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS
0.17% probability · 6th percentile
CISA KEV
Not listed
Weakness
CWE-835
Source
vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.