VulnerabilityReceived

CVE-2026-116676

From version 0.4.0 until 0.47.1, Atlantis passes the pull-request-controlled workspace value from atlantis.yaml into Terraform command arguments that are joined with strings.Join(args, " ") and executed through sh -c.

HIGH 8.8EPSS —

Does this matter?

High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unscored. Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.

Description

Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. From version 0.4.0 until 0.47.1, Atlantis passes the pull-request-controlled workspace value from atlantis.yaml into Terraform command arguments that are joined with strings.Join(args, " ") and executed through sh -c. An authenticated contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name, causing arbitrary commands to execute as the Atlantis service account without custom workflows, apply permission, or a malicious Terraform provider. External contributors can reach the flaw through fork pull requests only when --allow-fork-prs is enabled, while eligible same-repository branches do not require that option. The commands inherit the Atlantis process environment and can access cloud-provider, Terraform, and version-control credentials as well as files, state, and network resources available to the service. This issue is fixed in version 0.47.1.

CVSS 3.1: 8.8 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS: No score yet
Public exploits: None in Exploit-DB
CISA KEV: Not listed
Weakness: CWE-78
Source: security-advisories@github.com

References

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA, exploits from Exploit-DB. Refreshed daily. Download this record as JSON.