CVE-2026-110724
A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.27%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.27% probability · 19th percentile
- Public exploits
- None in Exploit-DB
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-269, CWE-639, CWE-863
- Source
- emo@eclipse.org
EPSS moved from 0.2% on 16 October 2026 to 0.3% on 26 October 2026.
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA, exploits from Exploit-DB. Refreshed daily. Download this record as JSON.