CVE-2026-102760
When NetX Secure is built with `NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR`, every TLS record sent on an active session is wiped after it has been handed to TCP.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.21%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
When NetX Secure is built with `NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR`, every TLS record sent on an active session is wiped after it has been handed to TCP. By then the TCP layer owns the packet chain and may already have released it to the packet pool. The wipe therefore writes zeros into packets that are free or in use by another thread, and when a reused packet's pointers no longer describe the old data, the length of the wipe underflows and it runs past the end of the packet pool.
- CVSS 4.0
- 8.3 HIGHCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.21% probability · 11th percentile
- Public exploits
- None in Exploit-DB
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-416
- Source
- emo@eclipse.org
EPSS moved from 0.2% on 30 September 2026 to 0.2% on 26 October 2026.
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA, exploits from Exploit-DB. Refreshed daily. Download this record as JSON.