CVE-2025-61929
When handling the MCP installation URL, it parses the base64-encoded configuration data and directly executes the command within it.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.47%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Cherry Studio is a desktop client that supports for multiple LLM providers. Cherry Studio registers a custom protocol called `cherrystudio://`. When handling the MCP installation URL, it parses the base64-encoded configuration data and directly executes the command within it. In the files `src/main/services/ProtocolClient.ts` and `src/main/services/urlschema/mcp-install.ts`, when receiving a URL of the `cherrystudio://mcp` type, the `handleMcpProtocolUrl` function is called for processing. If an attacker crafts malicious content and posts it on a website or elsewhere (there are many exploitation methods, such as creating a malicious website with a button containing this malicious content), when the user clicks it, since the pop-up window contains normal content, the direct click is considered a scene action, and the malicious command is directly triggered, leading to the user being compromised. As of time of publication, no known patched versions exist.
- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.47% probability · 39th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-94
- Affected
- cherry-ai/cherry studio
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
References
- https://github.com/CherryHQ/cherry-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-hh6w-rmjc-26f6Exploit, Third Party Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.