CVE-2025-34500
Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.14%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.0 HIGHCVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M
- EPSS
- 0.14% probability · 4th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-321, CWE-327, CWE-347
- Source
- disclosure@vulncheck.com
References
- https://www.ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IOActive-card-shuffler-security.pdf
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/shuffle-master-deck-mate-2-insecure-update-chain
- https://www.wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack/
- https://www.wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shufflers-allegedly-enabled-a-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba/
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.